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BOOK REVIEW
A review of a 1964 book in 1967-one on criminal procedure at
that-may seem patently absurd. And Law and Tactics in Federal
Criminal Cases, edited by George W. Shadoan, is a handbook on federal criminal procedure. But even if this book were only a compilation or digest of leading, key and trend cases in such areas of the
criminal law as search and seizure and confession, it would be important as indicative of the "racial revolution" in judicial prescriptions culminating in the notable or infamous (depending on to whom
you talk) Mirandav. Arizona.
One who is uninitiated in the intricacy and sophistry of our
criminal procedure perhaps will be appalled by the welter of rules
and by the explicit necessity for competent counsel to twist, distinguish, and extrapolate to give them relevancy and efficacy in
his particular case. Without highlighting the cases enumerated,
suffice it to say that the "law" is laid out clearly and precisely with
intelligent but generally short elucidation in penumbral areas. A
pocket part is due this summer; if it is handled as well as the
instant material, the book will be at least adequate and instructive
to counsel looking for fast answers as to what is the law or at least
what the federal courts seem to indicate is the law.
But if a pocket part is due soon, why not wait for its publication and then review the up-to-date product? The answer, in
which lies the point of this review, is that there is no need to wait.
The case digesting in 1964 was competent and it will certainly be
so in 1967. With all the hue and cry over the impact of Miranda
on police operations the case, like all criminal procedure cases, is
merely symbolic.1 Shadoan has edited a "how to do it" book which
meets its purpose: it will inform competent counsel on how to
do it. It is apposite to quote from the work's own raison d'etre:
"The practice of criminal law is no longer the simple matter of
presenting a factual defense, and contrary to the unspoken dictum
of many law schools, every lawyer is not qualified to try a criminal
case. Indeed even an expert civil trial lawyer may well tremble at
the prospect of entering the dark domain of a criminal court. The
purpose of this book is to expose some of the modern complexities
of a federal criminal trial. We have tried to make the volume basic
so authoritative as to be a
enough to be a guide to the novice and
12
valued reference to the experienced."
1
2

For an incisive elucidation of symbolic values see, T. APxoLD, THE
SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935).
CASES iii (G.
Preface to LAw AND TAcTIcs IN FEDERAL CRnUnVMq
SmUOAN ed. 1964). [hereinafter cited as LAW AND TACTIcS].
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The book has accomplished what it attempted. Were I to play
true to the form of critical review, I might disdainfully and with
some asperity inveigh against the initial nine pages of the book.
The simplistic checklist for handling a criminal case from its inception ridicules, by its handholding and leading phraseology, the
competency of the bulwarks and even the lesser guns of our criminal
bar (if we still have to distinguish the "criminal" specialist from
the not-so-criminal specialist). "There are certain standard steps
and principles of investigation appropriate to every criminal case
regardless of court or jurisdiction." The next sentence states, "It
would be beneficial to provide to attorneys in every federal district the particulars of how and where they can most effectively
gather the facts of their case."3 (Emphasis indeed added.) In appropriate paragraph form we are then told the hows, whens, and
wheres of: 1) inspecting the file of the case, 2) inspecting the
search warrant, 3) inspecting the arrest warrant, 4) inspecting the
criminal conviction record of government witnesses, 5) obtaining a
copy of the defendant's criminal conviction record, 6) inspecting
various police forms, inter alia.
On one such checklist item we are told to "interview the Assistant United States Attorney assigned to prosecute the case. His
name will be found in the criminal jacket or can be obtained by
calling the United States Attorney's Office. Such an interview can
be mutually advantageous if the prosecutor discloses sufficient information to enable defense counsel to accurately evaluate the desirability of a disposition of the case in advance of trial.' 4 The next
section breaks down various crimes into appropriate checklist headings in much the same mode.
But any laughs which may be derived from such a handling
of checklist materials is indeed on those of us committed to any
legal process, be it criminal or civil. Much the same treatment
could and I am sure has been accorded to the civil law, which, although perhaps not so dramatic, can be equally significant to the
client either wealthy or poor in counsel or material goods. The
authors of this book have patted us on the back and assured us
the criminal law is complex for the average attorney and even for
the criminal law specialist. They have offered to lead us through
the Alice in Wonderland world of the criminal law equivalents of
the old common law surrebuttor. Too few of us really know where
the appropriate forms are, or, often, of the very existence of forms
which are relevant and essential to adequate representation. We
3
4

LAW AND TAcTIcs, supra note 2, at 1.

Id. at 6.
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have all heard the old rubric that cases are won through preparation. But preparation implies something more than versing or reversing one's self with the litany from appropriate cases. Here at
least we have a sourcebook which says, "Look, go down and check
this form, and it will give you such and such information which is
relevant for the following purposes." This information is not available in the average or probably the better than average criminal
law course. Nor am I implying any deficiency in such courses;
they are generally good; they teach the criminal law-whatever that
may be in 1964 or 1967. An attack on such courses would be a
declaration against interest which in this case I am not about to
make. The average criminal law course has little time to grapple
with such "irrelevancies" as the existence or contents of police
reports. This information is useful, certainly, but not so appropriate
as to displace the more significant dialetical analyses of mens rea,
of what constitutes an act, of posited philosophical alternatives of
responsibility, and of disposition.
Where then can the law student or the lawyer who is called,
requested or in some other way moved to defend an accused find
this information? Seminar courses may be offered in specific
criminal procedural details but often these are involved with policy
considerations of more interest and significance than dull detail.
Some schools, through foundation monies, have instituted field
work in areas of the criminal law, e.g., cruising with working police
officers. These programs provide viable material for classroom
discourse and feed back into the respective seminar to the benefit
of nonparticipating students. These courses are generally by their
nature limited to a few interested students. The young lawyer can
learn his trade, and acquire familiarity with the necessary tools for
mere adequate craftsmanship, in district attorneys' offices and, in
some geographical areas, public defenders offices. But again these
are but a small part of the bar.
We assume the right to counsel; the United States Supreme
Court and lesser tribunals have fleshed out the bare concept and are
continuing to provide the necessary "magical" words to ensure
adequate counsel. And saying does make it so on one important
level: the symbolic level again using Arnold's term. The appropriate formal obeisance to the righteous demand for counsel has been
presented, and so much the better if the criminally accused (whom
we "know" is probably guilty) is still caught by the process and
made to pay his just penalty after having had his due process. 5
5 See Diamond, The Children of Leviathan: Psychoanalytic Speculations
Concerning Welfare Law and Punitive Sanctions, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 357
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Still, we can all cry "cheater's proof." That is, if the counsel provided was incompetent, the conviction "proves" nothing. Is the
formal obeisance then any more than a facade for an unfair trial?
On the other hand, should we even question the concept of
right to counsel as anything more than a symbol? Should the pronouncement from the courts guaranteeing this right suffice in
itself if we can show that the mere presence of a body called counsel
satisfies the "symbolic need" of the individual. Moreover, very
often even the individual who has had ineffective counsel will vent
his rage or his aggression toward the figure of incompetency (i.e.,
his lawyer) and neither at the symbolic idea of counsel nor, indeed,
at the system itself.
Arnold has decried such showings of inefficiencies, illogicalities and lags in the process as off point to the analytical examination of a functioning order. "It is," he says, "child's play for the
realist to show that law is not what it pretends to be and that its
theories are sonorous, rather than sound; that its definitions run in
circles; that applied by skillful attorneys in the forum of the court
it can only be an argumentative technique; that it constantly seeks
escape from reality through alternate reliance on ceremony and
verbal confusion. Yet the legal realist falls into grave error when
he believes this to be a defect in the law. From any objective point
of view the escape of the law from reality constitutes not its weakness but its greatest strength. Legal institutions must constantly
reconcile ideological conflicts, just as individuals reconcile them
back into a sort of institutional subconby shoving inconsistencies
'6
scious mind."
Admitting of the multiple conflicting values sought to be appeased by the legal process, of the need for elasticity from rigid
though aesthetically pleasing logic, of the factual lag between
norms and ideals, there comes a point where such sophistry breaks
down, where "symbols" lose their luminosity and the system
thereby falls into disrepute until new symbols can be rearticulated
through a mass emotional process (if a conscious process at all).
Movement toward reform can for a time preserve the efficacy of the
symbol, but if the movement goes on too long and is still unavailing,
it would seem that the symbol must be modified to preserve a
modicum of certainty, of freedom from the frustration and anxiety
(1966) where the author, a psychiatrist, speculates on the reason for
our ambivalent attitudes concerning the "non-person," the category
including the criminal and too often the accused criminal in addition
to the poor.
6

T.

ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT
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which must go along with the realization that the ideal which the
symbol connotes cannot any longer be accorded even the lip service
formerly paid it as its minimal due.
The question of competency of counsel has been raised in relationship to this book since the very function of the treatise is to
make available one source whereby counsel who is competent in
all respects except for immediate recall or perhaps even knowledgeability in the area of the criminal procedure can be put on notice of
his minimal duties and in some cases tactical options. The authors
of this work seem indeed competent manipulators and scholars of
the process they are explicating. But one must wonder whether a
criminal counsel reading for the first time how-to-do-it lists can
ever hope to do it right the first couple of times. Does this mean
then that an attorney handling his first criminal case must be considered prima facie incompetent, be he new to the bar or merely
new to the criminal process? The fact that other professions, e.g.,
medicine, have the same problem and also deal in problems vitally
significant to the individual does not answer the problem. Nor
can we equate competency necessarily with experience. An inexperienced attorney may intuitively or consciously using the tools
he has acquired do a workmanlike and perhaps a brilliant job; the
biographies and autobiographies of many renowned trial counsel
so inform us.
We can indeed acknowledge a certain amount of incompetency
for reasons of sheer lack of ability, lack of experience, lack of particular expertise without inveighing against the entire system. And
we have recognized that there is a paucity of adequate criminal trial
counsel to fulfill the constitutional symbol of right to counsel which
must mean the right to reasonably knowledgeable and effective advocacy. Money is certainly not any sole solution to this problem nor
to any problem inherent in the adversary system of criminal justice.
Often we do not know how to employ the financial resources we do
have.
Perhaps justice does not require competent counsel but merely
a matching of incompetent adversaries. The theme of the treatise
is to provide information to aid the defense in achieving some
knowledge of the complexity of law and possible tactical employment of rules and procedures in the adversary game. We feel smug
with the so-called genius of the adversary system. We are assured
that despite human foible the system as it works is an effective
means of procuring justice. Our experiments with a parens patriae
limitation on adversariness in juvenile cases has certainly not convinced us of the efficacy and justice of a loosened procedure. In
fact the reverse trend is becoming at least a verbal reality, i.e.,
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the panoply of rights safeguarded to the accused adult are being
increasingly demanded for youth. Justice Fortas has commented
on this need: "While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent
years raise serious questions as to whether actual performance
measures well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerfrom the reach of constitutional
able the immunity of the process
7
guarantees applicable to adults."
Certain tactical problems are highlighted and explicated, suggestive of numerous others and of approaches to meet them. One
such example handled well indicates the "restructuring of the case"
by the prosecution through manipulation of ambiguous or out of
context statements which to the jury can be decisive admissions.
To illustrate: a defendant who had told two different exculpatory
stories to the police, the first indicating no knowledge of the affair
and the second, post-lineup, admitting some knowledge but denying complicity, might have been asked why he had lied the first
time. In response he might say, "I didn't think that the complaining witness could identify me because I didn't rob him and
I wasn't involved although I was present. Now that he has identified me, I told you the truth." The prosecutor [in an incriminatory tone] might ask the defendant on cross-examination: "Didn't
you tell the police that you lied to them because you didn't think
the complaining witness could identify you?"s
Ethics exist on many levels as applied to the criminal process.
Since we are playing an adversary game only certain holds are
barred; moreover, often even alert defense counsel will not be in
a position to cope with such prosecutorial distortion. If he is alert,
prepared and otherwise competent, this book suggests certain possible approaches. At least it indicates this and related problems of
which defense counsel must be aware to be even in the game. How
then can such use of admissions be countered? The treatise goes
into an explicit handling of discovery devices available to the defense. The issues are presented where possible in clearcut fashion;
the book suggests the ambiguity or nonexistence of answers. Trial
counsel is in a no man's land with limited time (after all he must
have other cases to handle) to discover the statements of the accused and to attempt to obtain from the prosecution, where the
rules permit, statements of witnesses as well as physical evidence
or reports indicating physical indicia of the alleged crime, e.g.,
fingerprints or handwriting specimens.
7 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966); see In re Gault, 35
U.S.L. WEEK 4399 (May 15, 1967).
8 LAW AND TACTICS, supra note 2, at 109.
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The treatise in no way purports to provide the philosophical or

jurisprudential bases underlying where such do underlie the assorted prescriptions. We are told that the prosecution may in good
faith or otherwise destroy documents which are reachable under
discovery, and we are told what alternatives are open to the de-

fense in such a case based on past case experience. No comment is
made on ethical considerations; such are assumed or left to the dis-

cretion and/or conscience of the particular counsel. Nor could we
expect a book of this comparatively short and compact length
pages counting index) to cope with abstruse ethical pitfalls.
a caveat should be indicated: the game does have some rules
scribing tactics of opposing counsel, and the answers are not
obvious in the canons.

(331
But
prothat

The truly ritualistic, most pragmatic and perhaps most useful
section of the treatise deals with the presentation of the insanity
defense. We are told that "counsel should ask the potential witness whether he belongs to the 'dynamic' or the 'organic' school
and whether he has had any additional training, such as in psychoanalysis. Unless the defendant's current symptomatology is so
gross that a mere description and classification of his behaviour
will convince the jury of his lack of criminal responsibility, a psychiatrist of the 'organic' school will not make an effective witness."D Undoubtedly the advice is correct, and if it is, it highlights
the fact that truth is not really in issue but persuasive force and
plausibility carry the day. Moreover, we are informed that, "the
doctors at St. Elizabeth's Hospital [the section, as indeed the entire
treatise, centers on Washington, D.C., with leading cases from other
jurisdiction indicated where relevant] tend to be more conservative than those in private practice."' 0 The net impact is that the
public psychiatrist can generally be counted on to find an absence
of mental illness in a criminal case. Not so surprisingly, where the
symbols change, in civil commitment proceedings, the same doctors
are likely to find mental illness sufficient for commitment under
the criterion of "dangerous to self or to others."" The remainder
of the section handles the trial preparation for the insanity defense, including interviewing of witnesses, selection and relationship with chosen psychiatrists, and examination and cross-examination of psychiatric experts. The section does not attempt to de
definitive of questions of examination but provides an excellent
checklist and strategic foundation in an area which is metaphysical
9 Id. at 243-44.
10 Id. at 245.
11 See generally T. SzAsz, LAw, LIBERTY, Au PsycmAmY (1963); J. KATZ,
J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ, PsYCHOANALYSIS AND THE LAW (1967).
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to most laymen and not a few attorneys.
The important issue is then whether the government has a
right to examine the defendant and whether such examination is
in conflict with the fifth amendment freedom from self-incrimination. Defense arguments for the fifth's application are indicated in
the book, with the likely prosecution counter arguments. The issue is let unresolved in policy development, but true to form the
advice given will at least preserve the record-not a mean feat
since without proper foundation even the fifth's rights can conceivably be deemed waived.
In this respect we are told that, "if the court orders counsel not
to give such advice [i.e., advice not to cooperate with the state
psychiatrist] and orders the defendant to cooperate under pain of
contempt, the issue is preserved for appeal and there appears to
be, as yet, no appellate authority in this issue. ' 12 Whether counsel
should ethically resort to self help, i.e., refuse even with the court
order to allow his client to submit, is unanswered and falls to the
increasing responsibility of counsel. The perhaps easier issue of
whether the accused has the right to counsel during psychiatric examination is also unanswered. 18 We have to answer, moreover, to
the question of whether the "state's" psychiatrist can testify over
the objection of accused's privilege. The function and role of psychiatrist is left to his individual ethics and those of his profession.
It would seem, however, that the legal profession would have definite concern for the impact of psychiatric function and ethics as it
relates to the criminal and civil commitment processes.
The burden of proof is upon the prosecution to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt the defendant's sanity after evidence is submitted by the defense to rebut the initial presumption of sanity.
We have then one of the paradoxes of the insanity defense issue if
we presuppose that defendant is insane. The state's psychiatrist
approaches the accused in his capacity of doctor-a role of trust
which when coupled with the expertise of the psychiatrist in effectuating a trust situation and the possibly impaired self-protecting mechanism of the defendant indicates at least confused psychiatric roles. We know that the adversary proceeding is capable of
destroying psychiatric disinterest so that often the state's psychiatrist becomes committed in good faith to the state's positions. His
very charge is to attempt to pierce any dissembling and possible
malingering. His role is opposed to the best interests of the accused for the practical purpose of prevailing on the insanity de12 LAW AND TACTICS,

13

supra note 2, at 250.

See Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967).
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fense. Moreover, any admissions he makes to this doctor (a figure
who generally represents help qua the doctor symbol) will be effectively used by the psychiatrist at trial. It would seem that at
least the psychiatrist should be charged with apprising the accused
of his, the psychiatrist's, conflictual role.
The question that remains if we opt for the presence of counsel
at the psychiatric examination is what function can he play to safeguard his client, short of advising noncooperation or complete silence. The presence of counsel can set the accused at ease; counsel
can again advise him against the necessity for dissembling although
a competent psychiatrist will be able to determine that even the
process of stimulation can mask more serious symptomatology. Of
most importance, however, counsel aware of psychiatric dynamics,
(a necessity for competency to handle the defense) will observe
the technique of the psychiatrist and will be able to challenge any
assertions the psychiatrist later makes on the basis of his examination by indicating flaws or inconsistencies with the used technique
as opposed to accepted tenets of the school to which the psychiatrist subscribes. This is in addition to any possible attacks on the
basis for the dynamic principles being asserted.
A very practical device for influencing the jury's finding is
available in Washington, D.C., as stated in Lyles v. United States:
unless affirmatively waived the accused has a right to the ...
instruction that the consequence of an acquittal by reason of insanity will not result in outright release of the accused, but that
he will be confined in a hospital for the mentally ill until the
hospital superintendent has certified and the court is satisfied that
the accused has recovered his sanity and will not be dangerous
to
himself or to others in the reasonably forseeable future. 14
The impact of such an instruction is obvious; the jury is reassured
that a not guilty by reason of insanity finding will not automatically release the accused to the potential danger of the public.
The existence of this model in the District of Columbia leads
us to question why the whole criminal procedure is not fitted into
this paradigm. In the general case where the insanity defense is
asserted the commission of the proscribed act is almost always
stipulated. Why then don't we focus immediately upon the question of immediate potential dangerousness and alternative disposition instead of playing off opposing psychiatric experts on determining sanity-a legal concept and therefore one theoretically
without the psychiatric domain? 15 This question would seem par14 254 F.2d 725 (D.D.C. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958), cited in

LAW AND TAcTics, supra note 2, at 287.
15 See Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness---Some Obser-
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ticularly relevant when we admit the difficulty (if we admit the
possibility) of determining insanity. Society's present answer
seems to be the play of symbols again; if not insane, the convict
should go to prison assuredly for "rehabilitation" but certainly at
least for punishment. If insane he should be committed to any
mental institution which can "cure" his illness. We are all aware
of the paradoxes that often the prisons in a particular jurisdiction
do a better job of treatment on the psychotic (if we equate insanity with psychosis, whatever either is) than does the mental
institution in that jurisdiction. Moreover, often the accused will
serve a shorter term in the prison than the much more indefinite
mental commitment invoked because of a criminal act.
If for the moment we forget the futility often indicated by
practical considerations, what theoretical purposes will be accomplished by making findings of dangerousness as opposed to findings
of insanity? We can expect a turn in the position taken by the
prospective psychiatric experts; the state's psychiatrist will find
dangerousness generally while the defense will present psychiatric
testimony of lesser dangerousness potential. We might be able to
consolidate all those considered dangerous into one institution and
concentrate our efforts there, rather than diffusing efforts in arbitrarily differentiated institutions (if not arbitrary, often at least
disposition to a prison or mental institution is fortuitous). Moreover, we can perhaps add a classification of treatibility so as to
concentrate efforts of those with the greatest potential toward
coping in our society, in accordance with the general societal dictates. "Dangerousness" and "treatibility" as categories, however,
create definitional problems in themselves which will be subject
(indeed, for "dangerousness" has already been subject) to abuse
and misapplication. Of more import the shift in sequence will
probably create the same dispositional process even though we
change labels. This does not mean we should give up efforts to
refine our procedural framework, but that we should acknowledge
that we must examine underlying policy questions for a significant
change as opposed to mere label modifications and manipulation.
Such change may at the outset permit a liberalization of ambulatory release alternatives, but if society after weighing all conflicting values opts for security by means of some form of incarceration, this result will follow despite label change.
The treatise neglects the whole area of postconviction remedies
which is in the developmental process and which is often the most
vations on the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of
Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225 (1960).
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effective tool for accomplishing the results sought by defense counsel, but the scope of the book in its purpose is confined to pre-trial
and trial procedures. In respect to the pre-trial insanity issue, the
treatise does draw the distinction between the conceptualization of
competency to stand trial as opposed to the presentation of the
insanity defense, but little time is spent on the incompetency to
stand trial issue which can be a highly relevant procedural weapon
for, and too often against, the defense. Too often the prosecution
can assert the incompetency to stand trial issue to effectuate a
commitment without the necessity of presentation of evidence of
the offense at trial, thereby avoiding losing a close or weak case.
It is at this stage where the above proposed model can be particularly suitable. If a defendant is found to be incapable of either
communicating in any way with his counsel or is incapable of understanding the nature of the offense with which he is charged,
the prosecution should first have the burden of proving the proscribed act; if the act is proved a determination of dangerousness
can be made with dispositions ranging from ambulatory care to institutionalization. The problem arises where the prosecution proves
the act and the defense later discovers defenses possibly precluded
to him because of the inability of defendant to communicate. At
this point we can provide for a new hearing by right. Thus if the
defense at the outset can show a bona fide defense, defendant is
freed; if defense can show defendant to be non-dangerous, defendant is released; if defense later discovers a defense possibly precluded because of a block in communication with defendant, defendant will get a new hearing.
The treatise ends with an appendix highlighting, by actual
record testimony, techniques to use in examining witnesses, and
psychiatric experts, and in cross-examining psychiatric expertsall in relationship to the insanity defense. The examples are well
chosen models of how to do it, and indicate dramatically plays
which are open to effective counsel to substantiate or circumscribe
an opposing theory by the use of deft verbal and psychological
skills which often are above and beyond the merit of the question,
but which must be employed if we insist that the system we have
is the best way to play the game. The record excerpts suggest,
by their dramatic appeal, the pertinency of all record use as a significant teaching device adding a new dimension of vitality and
flesh and blood reality, something difficult to extrapolate from
the courtroom to the classroom. But the treatise as a whole shows
that the game is complex, substantially more complex than mere
rule application and perhaps beyond the immediate capabilities
of too many who are confronted with more adept and deft counsel.
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The legal issues in 1964 are the same today with more emphasis
today on problems of eavesdropping and increasingly more subtle
distinctions in case law. But the 1967 pocket part will bring the
rules up to date. The only important thing is that we are all
playing the same game and playing it correctly; if not we hurt
not only the individual client but the game itself which perhaps
will lead to a new game. Who knows if that would be good or
bad. But we lawyers know what we have and have a commitment
at least to attempt to make it work.
Leonard V. Kaplan*
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